Myanmar\u27s cross-border trade with China : beyond informal trade by Kubo Koji
Myanmar's cross-border trade with China :
beyond informal trade
著者 Kubo Koji
権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア
経済研究所 / Institute of Developing
Economies, Japan External Trade Organization
(IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp
journal or
publication title
IDE Discussion Paper
volume 625
year 2016-12
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/1601
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
  
IDE Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated  
to stimulate discussions and critical comments 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Myanmar, cross-border trade, informal trade, transaction costs of trade  
JEL classification: O17, O53, F19 
  
* Development Studies Center, IDE (Koji_Kubo@ide.go.jp) 
IDE DISCUSSION PAPER No. 625 
 
Myanmar’s Cross-border Trade with 
China: Beyond Informal Trade 
 
Koji KUBO* 
 
December 2016 
Abstract  
Myanmar’s trade with China is heavily concentrated in cross-border trade through the Yunnan 
province of China. In this qualitative analysis, we examine factors that yield such a concentration 
from the viewpoint that trade would be concentrated in the channel where transaction costs are 
relatively low compared with those in other channels. It is almost certain that weak law 
enforcement at the border gives rise to informal cross-border trade, which allows traders to save 
the time and costs for compliance with formal procedures. Apart from informality, unique 
institutional arrangements have been emerging spontaneously in the border area that can reduce 
transaction costs in a way compatible with formal trade, thus augmenting cross-border trade. 
Based on observations of thriving trade at Myanmar’s border with China, we draw implications 
for the country’s general trade facilitation measures. 
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Myanmar’s Cross-border Trade with China: Beyond Informal Trade 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Myanmar’s trade with China is heavily concentrated in cross-border trade through the 
Yunnan province of China. According to Taguchi and Oizumi (2014), Yunnan 
province’s bilateral trade with Myanmar, which is approximately equivalent to the 
cross-border trade between the two countries, by far exceeds the normal level predicted 
by a gravity model of trade. From the viewpoint that trade would be concentrated in the 
channel where transaction costs are relatively low compared with those in other 
channels, we shed light on factors that yield such a concentration in this location. 
The main trading node in Myanmar’s cross-border trade with China is Muse town, 
which is adjacent to China’s border town Ruili in Yunnan province. This trading node is 
on the Yangon–Mandalay–Muse/Ruili–Kunming corridor, and the segment between 
Mandalay and Kunming is labeled as Asian Highway No. 14.1 The segment between 
Mandalay and Muse spans 450 kilometers, and it goes through mountainous terrain with 
steep climbs and tight curves. Due to its poor road conditions, the transportation cost for 
Myanmar’s cross-border trade is not low (Ksoll and Quarmby 2014). 
In the present paper, we focus on institutional factors of cross-border trade that may 
reduce transaction costs, making up for these high logistics costs. Weak law 
enforcement in the border area is likely to be a force giving rise to informal cross-border 
trade that allows traders to save the transaction costs for compliance with trade-related 
regulations. Apart from informality, we investigate institutional arrangements in the 
border area that may also reduce transaction costs. By identifying the institutional 
arrangements that are conducive for reducing transaction costs in cross-border trade, we 
aim to draw implications for Myanmar’s general trade promotion schemes. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief review of the literature on 
Myanmar’s trade and cross-border trade. Section 3 examines trade statistics to draw 
characteristics of cross-border trade out of the entire volume of bilateral trade between 
                                            
1 There is a sharp contrast between Asian Highway No. 14 (AH14) connecting Myanmar with China 
and Asian Highway No. 1 (AH1) connecting Myanmar with Thailand. In recent years, AH1 has 
attracted development aid from the international society for road Quality Improvement within the 
Myanmar section. In contrast, the Myanmar section of AH14 has been developed and maintained by 
a build–operate–transfer scheme of the Myanmar government with a Myanmar local contractor.  
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Myanmar and China. Section 4 overviews the regulatory environment of cross-border 
trade as well as formal initiatives for trade facilitation at the border. With a case study of 
Myanmar’s border trade of mango exports, Section 5 discusses institutional 
arrangements other than the formal initiatives that boost cross-border trade. Furthermore, 
we draw implications of thriving cross-border trade for a general trade promotion 
strategy. Section 6 summarizes the analyses and concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Myanmar shares a land border with China’s land-locked Yunnan province. Thus, 
Yunnan’s provincial trade statistics for exports to and imports from Myanmar can be 
interpreted as representing cross-border trade between the two countries (Mya Than 
2005; Kudo 2013). 
Several empirical studies have quantitatively analyzed Myanmar’s cross-border trade 
with China.2 Using data on bilateral international trade flows for Yunnan province for 
the period from 1988 to 1999, Poncet’s (2006) gravity model of trade by finds that trade 
between Yunnan and Myanmar has progressively declined from an above-standard level 
to a normal level. In contrast, using updated data for the 2000–2012 periods, Taguchi 
and Oizumi (2014) show that Yunnan’s exports to and imports from Myanmar by far 
exceed the normal level predicted by the gravity model. In fact, Myanmar accounted for 
53.3 percent of Yunnan’s exports and 33.9 percent of its imports in 2012. 
Cross-border trade is often associated with informal trade. Lesser and Moise-Leeman 
(2009) illustrate that weak law enforcement at borders encourages firms engaged in 
cross-border trade to evade import and export duties and regulatory requirements.3 In 
                                            
2 Myanmar’s cross-border trade with China is often discussed in the context of the economic 
integration of the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS). Apart from the papers cited in this paragraph, 
the empirical analysis by Edmonds and Fujimura (2008) using gravity trade model finds that the 
development of cross-border road infrastructure has had a positive impact on bilateral trade in the 
region. 
3 In the context of Africa, there is a growing body of literature that sheds light on the significance of 
smuggling across land borders. These include Golub and Mbaye (2009) and Nkendah (2103) among 
others. Menon (1998) discusses the impacts of import tariff on smuggling in the context of the 
cross-border trade between Lao PDR and Thailand. 
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fact, Kubo (2012) shows that when cross-border trade accounts for a high proportion in 
Myanmar’s imports from China, there are considerable discrepancies between the trade 
values reported by authorities of the two countries; Myanmar’s statistics largely 
underestimate the country’s imports from China. This implies that informal trade has 
been an impetus for imports through cross-border trade. Nonetheless, the discrepancies 
in trade statistics represent only part of the conducted informal trade; Lesser and 
Moise-Leeman (2009) point out that trade flows exist that are not captured by the 
authorities of either exporting or importing countries. 
More generally, modal choice of trade by businesses depends on transaction costs, 
and informality is just one factor that could reduce the transaction costs imposed by 
statutory regulations (Pohit and Taneja 2003). Furthermore, several factors other than 
informality can serve to reduce transaction costs of trade. Focusing on ethnicity and 
human networks, existing studies show that cross-border trade thrives where a common 
ethnicity or historical trading network spreads across the border, reducing the 
transaction costs of trade (Aker et al. 2014; Walther 2015).  
In the present study, we explore institutional factors in cross-border trade that reduce 
these transaction costs of trade. 
 
 
3. Insight from trade statistics 
 
3.1 Classification of international trade 
Myanmar’s authorities classify trade along two dimensions: by sector (government or 
private) and type of administration (normal or border). Border trade refers to overland 
trade with the four countries adjacent to Myanmar, namely Bangladesh, China, India, 
and Thailand.  
The regulation that distinguishes normal trade from border trade holds that 
settlements of normal trade must be conducted through authorized dealer banks using 
currencies designated by the central bank,4 whereas this requirement is waived for 
border trade.5 Border trade settlements can be made using cash in either the local or 
trading partner’s currency. Furthermore, traders are allowed to make border trade 
settlements using off-shore bank accounts, typically an account in a bank on the 
                                            
4 These are US dollars, Euros and Singapore dollars. 
5 Therefore, technically, there can be normal trade in which shipments go through a land border but 
the settlement is through an authorized dealer bank using a designated hard currency. 
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opposite side of the border. Other procedural requirements are, however, the same for 
border and normal trade. Myanmar’s border trade is not a concessional scheme for 
promotion of economic activities by micro- and small-size traders in peripheral border 
areas, such as an exemption of import duties for micro-size traders residing in the 
border area. 
The summary of the trade flows by sector and administration type given in Table 1 
confirms that the proportion of border trade out of the country’s total exports jumped 
from 22.2 percent in 2011 to 40.8 percent in 2015. This is largely due to natural gas 
exports to China via pipeline, which started in October 2013. 6 This trade alone 
amounted to US$ 1.8 billion in 2015, or 16.4 percent of the country’s total exports. 
Natural gas has been the country’s top export, being exported by pipeline to Thailand 
and China. While natural gas exports to Thailand have been labeled as normal trade, 
exports to China have been classified as border trade, probably due to the latter’s 
settlement currency being the Chinese yuan. Also, natural gas exports are registered 
solely as the government export. 
 
Table 1: Myanmar’s international trade by sector and type of administration,  
FY2011–FY20157 
 
Regarding the private sector, nearly two-fifths of Myanmar’s exports were border 
trade in 2014. The private sector’s border trade totaled 16.4 percent of the entire 
country’s aggregated exports and 14.8 percent of its imports. Border trade is a major 
trade channel for the economy, especially the private sector.  
Table 2 summarizes the trends in border trade disaggregated by trade post, showing 
that China is by far the largest partner in border trade, followed by Thailand. In 2015, 
China accounted for 93.2 percent of Myanmar’s border trade exports and 65.1 percent 
of imports, respectively. The corresponding figures for Thailand were 5.4 percent and 
33.5 percent. Border trade with Bangladesh and India was marginal.8  
 
Table 2: Myanmar’s border trade by trade post, FY2011–FY2015 
                                            
6 Note that the above-standard level of Yunnan’s trade measured by Taguchi and Oizumi (2014) is 
not due to natural gas since their estimation is for the period up to 2012. 
7 Fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31 of the next year. 
8 Singh (2007) shows that the stagnant cross-border trade between India and Myanmar is due to 
political insecurity in India’s border area. 
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Two border posts stand out in terms of trade values: Muse, on the border with China, 
and Myawaddy, on the border with Thailand. The export value of the Muse border post 
has included natural gas since October 2013. Nonetheless, exports from Muse, with the 
exception of natural gas, amounted to around US$ 2 billion, which is 10 times more 
than exports from the second largest border post. Furthermore, border trade in Muse is 
bi-directional while that of Myawaddy mostly comprises Myanmar’s imports. 
 
3.2 Position of cross-border trade in China’s trade with Myanmar 
Using Chinese trade statistics, we investigate the characteristics of cross-border trade in 
China’s trade with Myanmar. China publishes breakdowns of trade statistics by customs 
offices. Regarding trade with Myanmar, the trade recorded by the Kunming customs 
office in Yunnan province can be regarded as the sum of cross-border trade with 
Myanmar (Mya Than 2005; Kudo 2013). Table 3 summarizes the top 10 export and 
import items (by two-digit HS code9) of China’s trade with Myanmar along with the 
share of cross-border trade for each item. 
 
Table 3. Share of cross-border trade for China’s top 10 export/ import items  
traded with Myanmar, FY2013–FY2015 
 
Generally, the pattern of trade between China and Myanmar is one wherein China 
exports industrial products and Myanmar exports primary products.10 China’s major 
manufactured exports include electrical machinery (for example, cellular phones), 
industrial machinery, motorcycles and intermediate materials. Myanmar’s exports are 
concentrated in a small number of commodities such as precious stones (jade), natural 
gas and wood. China’s exports of precious stones are considered to be returned goods.  
Cross-border trade accounted for roughly a half of China’s trade with Myanmar. As 
for China’s exports, the share of cross-border trade out of China’s total exports reached 
55.3 percent in 2013, declining to 48.7 percent in 2014 and 42.7 percent in 2015. As for 
China’s imports, cross-border trade amounted to 66.4 percent of total imports in 2013, 
24.6 percent in 2014 and 55.2 percent in 2015. The decline in cross-border imports in 
2014 is due to an exceptional rise in imports of precious stones (jade) recorded by the 
                                            
9 Harmonized Commodity Description Coding System. 
10 Coxhead (2007) finds the similar trade patterns for Southeast Asian countries in general and 
argues possible adverse effects on the growth paths for these countries. 
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Shenzhen and Chongqing customs offices, which totaled US$ 9.9 billion. If this amount 
was excluded from the total imports, the share of cross-border trade would rise to 73.6 
percent in 2014. 
Looking at shares of cross-border trade disaggregated by product, some notable 
tendencies emerge. Regarding China’s exports, the share of cross-border trade tends to 
be high for consumer goods such as electrical machinery (cellular phones) and vehicles 
(motorcycles), but low for industrial goods and intermediate goods including machinery, 
iron, steel and plastic. This is partially due to the nature of these products; heavy and 
bulky products not suitable for long-haul land transport would be exported by sea 
instead. A good example of this is ships and boats. At the same time, it might be the case 
that Myanmar’s consumer-goods importers prefer cross-border trade to circumvent 
import procedures. We will discuss this hypothesis later.  
Regarding China’s imports, other than natural gas, which is exported by the pipeline, 
the proportion of cross-border trade is high for agricultural products including grains 
and rubber. However, this is not the full picture of cross-border trade. Some of 
Myanmar’s recorded exports do not appear in Chinese statistics at all, which we discuss 
in the next subsection.  
 
3.3 Discrepancies in border trade statistics 
Table 4 compares statistics of border trade compiled by China Customs and Myanmar 
Customs. Each panel lists the top 10 items exported or imported in cross-border. 
Imports from Myanmar are often under-reported in Chinese statistics. Similarly, 
Myanmar statistics often under-report imports from China. Product classifications are 
not always compatible between these two statistics. However, there are several 
distinctive discrepancies, which are discussed next. 
 
Table 4. Comparison of cross-border trade statistics, FY2014–FY2015 
 
First, regarding Myanmar’s cross-border exports to China, agricultural and food 
products such as sugar, maize, beans, sesame seeds and melons do not appear 
individually in Chinese import statistics. These totaled US$ 1.3 billion in 2015, which 
by far exceeds the sum of corresponding China’s recorded agricultural imports (grain, 
edible fruits, cereals, etc.) which reached US$ 0.1 billion. These imply smuggling from 
Myanmar to China. 
Second, there are notable discrepancies between Myanmar’s imports of electrical 
machinery and apparatus and China’s exports of electrical machinery. Myanmar’s 
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reported electrical machinery imports in 2015 were merely 18.2 percent of China’s 
reported exports. This gap implies Myanmar’s smuggling imports. 
These figures are consistent with the conjecture that a considerable degree of 
smuggling has been occurring in Muse and that informality is one driving force of 
cross-border trade. 
 
 
4. Institutional aspects of cross-border trade 
 
4.1 Regulatory environment of cross-border trade 
We will now review the regulatory environment surrounding cross-border trade at the 
Myanmar–China border. First of all, Myanmar’s cross-border trade regime is not a 
simplified trade regime for low-value consignments that do not exceed a certain 
threshold. Except for exemptions from trade settlement procedures, the processes are in 
principle the same for border trade and normal trade. 
From the viewpoint that weak law enforcement at borders spurs firms to engage in 
cross-border trade, the time and costs for Myanmar’s importers to comply with trade 
regulations are considerable. First, import licenses from the Ministry of Commerce are 
required for each import contract.11 Second, imports are also subject to import duties, 
and the tariff rate for most consumer electrical machineries, including cellular phones 
and televisions, is 10 percent. Third, the advance corporate income tax is levied on 
imports (2 percent of import value) at the time of customs clearance while this tax 
payment is offset from corporate income tax liabilities of that importer. These 
procedures are all the same for border and normal trade. Thus, through informal trade at 
the border, importers can evade these trade costs. 
For Myanmar’s exports, especially agricultural exports, China’s import controls have 
been influential. For example, China banned imports of rice from Myanmar on the basis 
of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures before granting an import quota of 
100,000 tons for 2015. Thus, Myanmar’s exports of rice and broken rice until 2014 were 
informal trade, although Myanmar’s annual export amounted to around 700,000 tons in 
2012 and 2013 (World Bank 2014). As China has implemented protective policies for 
                                            
11 Previously, all tariff items except those on the negative list had required import licenses. Since 
August 2015, as a method of trade liberalization, import licenses have been imposed on only 4,405 
tariff items on the positive list. 
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grains,12 wide gaps exist between Chinese domestic wholesale prices and border prices, 
which incentivize smuggling. The same story applies to sugar, a product for which 
Myanmar’s border-trade exports to China surged in 2015.13 
The cases of Myanmar’s rice and sugar exports clearly illustrate that there has been 
no coordination on border controls between Myanmar Customs and China Customs. 
Rice and sugar exports were recorded as formal trade on the Myanmar side, whereas 
these were unrecorded, smuggling imports on China’s side. Analogously, some of 
China’s exports, in particular of electrical machinery, were recorded only partially on 
the Myanmar side. The absence of coordination between the two countries’ authorities 
at the border gives rise to informal trade, eventually fostering cross-border trade. 
Furthermore, China’s stringent SPS measures for fresh fruits and vegetables are 
loosely applied at the land border with Myanmar. Imports from Myanmar by land 
border are exempt from the otherwise-required phytosanitary certificates from the 
exporting country’s authorities. This also reduces the trade costs for Myanmar exporters 
of the pertinent products. 
 
4.2 Formal initiative for trade facilitation at the border 
Apart from informality, formal initiatives exist for promotion of cross-border trade in 
Muse led by the Myanmar government. One is the above-mentioned exemption of the 
trade settlement requirement, which more than compensates for the absence of efficient 
international banking services in border areas. 
Another is the one-stop service (OSS) trade zone near Muse, which is located 15 
kilometers away from the border gate with China. The Muse trade zone houses six 
trade-related government offices including the Ministry of Commerce for export/import 
license applications, the Customs Department for customs clearance, and the Inland 
Revenue Department for payments of advance corporate income tax. The OSS trade 
zone is aimed to reduce the time needed for traders to comply with formal trade 
procedures.14  
Furthermore, the government of Myanmar has designated the area between the Muse 
                                            
12 See Gale (2015). 
13 When the author interviewed Myanmar merchants in Muse in May 2016, many of them stated that 
sugar was the most profitable item for export, and that it would pay to import sugar from a third 
country and re-export it to China via border trade. 
14 However, the Muse OSS trade zone is solely operated by the government of Myanmar, and it is 
not a single-window system of border control by authorities of two countries sharing the border. 
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trade zone and the border gate as a bonded area wherein import duties on retained goods 
are deferred and export goods can be stored after customs clearance out of Myanmar. 
Import duties are exempted for imported goods consumed within the bonded area. 
While evasion of import duties by individuals is tolerated, there are several inspection 
points and mobile inspection teams on the route between the Muse trade zone and cities 
for prevention of large-scale smuggling. Such inspections, however, often cause delays 
in transportation of imported goods from Muse to urban areas.  
 
 
5. Case study: Myanmar’s mango exports to Yunnan 
 
5.1 Supply chain of mangoes 
To shed light on non-tangible institutional arrangements that may further reduce 
transaction costs for cross-border trade, we illustrate the flow of business using a case 
study of Myanmar’s mango exports to Yunnan. Mangoes are one of Myanmar’s 
agricultural products whose top export market is China. In addition, Myanmar was the 
top supplier of import mangoes in the Chinese market for the 2008–2013 periods. 
Myanmar’s mango producers are linked to Chinese importers via the wholesale 
market in Muse. The major production areas of mangoes exported to China are 
Mandalay Division and southern Shan State, which are connected to the Muse border 
area by the Mandalay–Muse corridor. In Muse, an association of Myanmar merchants 
runs the wholesale market, where Chinese importers’ agents pay a daily visit across the 
border to participate in auctions during the harvest season (April to June). 
Approximately 40 Myanmar merchants receive above 100 Chinese buyers daily. 
Myanmar merchants serve as commission agents for suppliers, negotiating prices with 
Chinese buyers and receiving 3 to 5 percent of the sale value from the supplier as a 
commission fee. The wholesale market is located adjacent to the Muse trade zone, and 
the sold mangoes are sent to customs clearance immediately and delivered to the 
Chinese territory on the same day. 
The border trade with China has provided producers in these areas with access to the 
export market. Before the border trade surged in the later 2000s, mangoes used to be 
sold wholly on the domestic market. Producers were mostly small farmers who were 
linked to markets by intermediaries (collectors and packers) who were also small and 
medium enterprises. They did not have access to other foreign markets in the 2000s. We 
could argue that the border trade, especially the wholesale market in Muse, lowered the 
hurdles to accessing the export market. 
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The Muse wholesale market serves several significant functions in Myanmar’s 
mango exports. First, it reduces the search costs for finding buyers/sellers. Those 
producers and marketing agents sending mangoes to the wholesale market are micro- 
and small-scale enterprises for whom finding buyers independently is not always easy. 
Owing to the existence of the wholesale market, they can export mangoes to China as 
easily as selling them on the domestic market. This is also true for the buyers from 
China. 
Second, trading in the wholesale market near the border alleviates uncertainty 
regarding delivery time. For Chinese buyers, as the goods are already in the border area, 
they can easily be delivered to the Chinese territory. Given the underdeveloped 
transportation infrastructure in Myanmar, this is an advantage. For Myanmar producers, 
compared with arrangements required for shipping by ocean vessel, the logistics are 
much easier for land transport. 
Third, centralized trading in the wholesale market would typically reduce 
fluctuations in price than would occur with decentralized trading. In addition, the 
agglomeration of businesses in the wholesale market has yielded growth in related 
businesses such as services for logistic operators and remittance services, which also 
reduce transaction costs. 
Furthermore, the development of wholesale market is not peculiar to mangoes; there 
are equivalent wholesale markets for other fruits, including watermelon and musk 
melon, and grains, including rice. Since first emerging under private-sector initiatives in 
Muse, they have been proliferating. 
 
5.2 China’s demand for Myanmar’s agricultural products  
The growth of mango exports from Myanmar to China also owes much to China’s 
growing demand for agricultural products. In the face of China’s rapid economic growth 
and rising opportunity costs for labor in its agricultural sector, China’s agricultural 
imports are expected to continue to rise. The large price gap of agricultural products 
across the border is a significant pull factor of Myanmar’s exports. 
Geographical proximity and seasonal differences also work favorably for Myanmar’s 
exports of tropical fruits, such as mangoes, that have short shelf lives. Geographical 
proximity is particularly important for perishable food items. Major mango production 
areas are within one day’s travel time by land from the border gate with China. This 
grants a competitive edge to Myanmar mangoes. 
However, Myanmar’s mango exports face a risk of possible changes to China’s 
controls on cross-border trade. Currently, cross-border trade in Muse is a loophole in 
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China’s stringent SPS measures. Table 5 contrasts China’s import data on mangoes with 
Myanmar’s export data. In Chinese statistics, Myanmar had been the top supplier until 
2013, but imports from Myanmar disappeared in 2014 and 2015. Nonetheless, in 
Myanmar’s export data, exports maintained the momentum in 2014 and 2015. These 
data indicate that the cross-border mango trade is a gray area. Once China’s SPS 
measures are applied properly to border-trade imports from Myanmar, transaction costs 
of trade would rise for Myanmar’s exports. 
 
Table 5. China’s mango imports versus Myanmar’s mango exports 
 
5.3 Implications for trade facilitation 
One notable feature of cross-border trade in Muse is that a large number of small firms 
are exporting to China, which makes a stark contrast with the country’s normal trade by 
sea, where a small number of large firms occupy the market. From the viewpoint of 
trade promotion, such participation in exports by a large number of small firms is 
worthy of further exploration. On the assumption that informal and small firms have 
low profitability compared to large firms,15 what factors serve to lower the transaction 
costs of trade, thus letting smaller firms participate in export businesses? 
Certainly, one factor that reduces transaction costs is informality of cross-border 
trade. While mango exports go through formal trade-related procedures on the Myanmar 
side, they are not subject to the Chinese SPS measures. Accordingly, reducing the costs 
of compliance with importing countries’ SPS measures would facilitate access to the 
export market for small farmers and intermediaries of agricultural products. This 
involves the authorities undertaking trade negotiations with existing and potential 
importing countries on the one hand, and offering technical assistance to familiarize 
farmers and intermediaries with the regulations of importing countries. 
We also focus on the function of Muse’s wholesale market, which reduces the search 
cost of finding buyers. When the search cost of finding importers is a fixed cost, it 
adversely impacts smaller businesses than for larger businesses since the former’s 
transaction size is small relative to the cost. In this context, commission agents in the 
Muse wholesale market transform fixed search costs into a cost proportional to the sales 
value. In any case, the search cost is one major transaction cost for exporters in 
Myanmar. In this regard, a possible policy option for trade promotion is to invite foreign 
                                            
15 The survey article on the informal economy by La Porta and Shleifer (2014) shows that the 
self-employed and small firms have lower profitability compared with formal firms. 
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buyers to set up procurement offices in the country, which could function as a venue for 
small firms to meet foreign buyers, as in the Muse wholesale market. Myanmar 
authorities prohibited foreign investment in the area of international trade; the 2012 
Foreign Investment Law of Myanmar prohibited foreign firms from registering as a 
trading company. The advantages and drawbacks of such discrimination against foreign 
firms should be reconsidered.  
 
 
6. Concluding remark 
 
Regarding the heavy concentration of Myanmar’s bilateral trade with China in the 
channel of cross-border trade in Muse, we qualitatively examined factors that account 
for such a concentration from the viewpoint that trade would be concentrated in the 
channel where transaction costs are relatively low. According to China’s trade statistics, 
42.7 percent of China’s exports and 55.2 percent of imports in 2015 are considered to 
occur through the cross-border trade. 
It is found that informal trade is an impetus for the concentration of trade at the 
border. Weak law enforcement at the border and an absence of cooperation between the 
two countries’ authorities incited firms to informal trade to save the transaction costs of 
compliance with trade–related procedures. Myanmar’s agricultural exports unrecorded 
in corresponding Chinese statistics suggest a considerable degree of smuggling, and so 
do China’s electrical machinery exports. 
Apart from the informality of cross-border trade, we focused on the function of 
Muse’s wholesale markets, where daily agricultural-product auctions attract Chinese 
buyers across the border. By reducing the search costs of finding buyers, Muse’s 
wholesale markets have made the export market accessible to many small businesses, 
including farmers and intermediaries. As a policy implication emerging from this 
analysis of thriving cross-border trade, in relation to the reduction in search costs for 
small businesses to find foreign buyers, inviting foreign buyers to set up a procurement 
office in the country can be an option for trade promotion. 
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Table 1: Myanmar’s international trade by sector and type of administration,  
FY2011–FY2015 
 
Source: Myanmar Ministry of Commerce website 
  
Sector Type 2011/2012 2012/2013 2013/2014 2014/2015 2015/2016
Exports Government Normal 4,298 4,273 5,719 4,971 n.a.
(US$, mil.) Government Border 770 294 615 2,243 n.a.
Private Normal 2,809 2,570 2,724 3,259 n.a.
Private Border 1,259 1,839 2,146 2,050 n.a.
Total Normal 7,107 6,843 8,443 8,231 6,588
Total Border 2,028 2,134 2,761 4,293 4,549
Total Exports 9,136 8,977 11,204 12,524 11,137
Imports Government Normal 2,066 1,330 2,462 2,723 n.a.
(US$, mil.) Government Border 363 188 92 32 n.a.
Private Normal 5,629 6,500 9,470 11,416 n.a.
Private Border 977 1,050 1,735 2,463 n.a.
Total Normal 7,695 7,830 11,933 14,139 13,973
Total Border 1,340 1,239 1,827 2,494 2,605
Total Imports 9,035 9,069 13,760 16,633 16,578
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Table 2: Myanmar’s border trade by trade post, FY2011–FY2015 
 
Source: Myanmar Ministry of Commerce website 
 
  
2011/2012 2012/2013 2013/2014 2014/2015 2015/2016 2011/2012 2012/2013 2013/2014 2014/2015 2015/2016
Total 2,028.4 2,212.8 2,693.4 4,249.5 4,492.4 1,322.6 1,500.8 1,763.8 2,385.7 2,545.4
China Muse 1,737.2 1,583.8 2,166.6 3,581.8 3,775.9 1,030.7 1,152.7 1,255.6 1,612.8 1,529.4
Lweje 3.5 32.8 64.6 62.8 62.4 3.5 12.4 6.8 9.1 12.4
Chinshwehaw 72.5 191.8 205.6 350.6 321.8 0.8 15.2 28.8 64.9 52.2
Kanpawthi 8.7 112.0 5.6 8.6 25.5 127.6 8.1 22.0 49.5 65.7
Thailand Keng Tun 0.0 7.4 6.5 0.0 5.1 4.3
Tachileik 10.4 20.2 13.1 8.8 9.6 35.5 32.8 57.0 99.6 89.4
Myawaddy 10.5 77.6 48.2 32.0 42.7 14.0 183.5 220.4 404.3 644.9
Kawthaung 29.8 30.1 38.1 35.6 44.6 92.2 43.9 106.5 78.3 84.8
Myeik 124.4 125.2 109.1 105.7 139.0 10.6 25.2 39.8 39.6 29.8
Naburat/Htee Khee 0.0 0.1 0.3 2.0 15.9 1.3 3.9 11.1
Methaung 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.9 0.6 2.1
Bangladesh Sittwe 14.6 6.9 10.1 6.3 5.2 0.7 0.1 5.7 0.1 1.0
h Maungdaw 7.8 5.4 5.3 7.5 5.1 0.7 0.5 1.2 0.1 0.1
India Tamu 4.6 16.7 15.0 32.3 31.6 2.6 6.7 9.5 12.4 12.4
Rhi 4.3 10.3 11.9 9.5 20.1 3.9 3.9 7.2 5.4 5.8
Exports (USD, million) Imports (USD, million)
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Table 3. Share of cross-border trade for China’s top 10 export/import items  
traded with Myanmar, FY2013–FY2015 
(A) China’s exports to Myanmar 
 
 
(B) China’s imports from Myanmar 
 
Source: China Customs 
  
Description
Export value
(US$ mil.)
Share of
cross border
trade (%)
Export value
(US$ mil.)
Share of
cross border
trade (%)
Export value
(US$ mil.)
Share of
cross border
trade (%)
Total 8,106 55.3 9,684 48.7 8,762 42.7
Electrical Machinery 1,372 74.1 1,524 62.3 1,638 52.8
Machinery 1,037 29.6 954 33.7 1,036 31.3
Vehicles (Motorcycles, Trucks, Parts) 865 78.7 1,008 82.6 890 78.8
Iron and Steel 641 12.0 1,050 10.0 756 13.2
Iron/Steel Products 298 29.5 409 25.0 581 22.4
Ships and Boats 207 0.5 733 0.4 371 1.3
Precious Stones 694 99.9 963 99.9 343 100.0
Manmade Staple Fibers 312 73.8 297 70.8 283 67.2
Plastic 156 27.7 217 23.7 230 27.1
Knit, Crocheted Fabrics 97 20.4 129 15.7 172 11.5
Others 2,426 54.5 2,400 48.4 2,462 40.6
2013/2014 2014/2015 2015/2016
Description
Export value
(US$ mil.)
Share of
cross border
trade (%)
Export value
(US$ mil.)
Share of
cross border
trade (%)
Export value
(US$ mil.)
Share of
cross border
trade (%)
Total 3,635 66.4 14,834 24.6 5,262 55.2
Precious Stones 1,615 44.6 11,561 8.7 2,310 16.1
Natural Gas 386 100.0 1,492 100.0 1,702 100.0
Tin and Iron Ores 450 97.9 550 99.2 495 99.6
Wood 759 82.8 434 83.0 169 84.8
Iron and Steel 16 0.0 369 0.0 166 0.0
Misc Grain, Seed, Fruit 61 91.5 63 93.7 69 95.3
Rubber 113 87.6 94 91.3 64 93.6
Copper Cathodes 32 0.0 48 0.0 58 0.0
Woven Apparel 37 0.0 33 0.0 34 0.0
Fish and Seafood 54 5.8 48 12.0 29 15.0
Others 112 69.6 143 59.6 164 39.2
2013/2014 2014/2015 2015/2016
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Table 4. Comparison of cross-border trade statistics, FY2014–FY2015 
(A) Myanmar’s exports by cross-border trade 
 
 
(B) Myanmar’s imports by cross-border trade 
 
Sources: Myanmar Customs; China Customs 
Myanmar's exports to China by Muse Customs Office (US$, mil.) China's imports from Myanmar by Kunming Customs Office (US$, mil.)
Description 2014/2015 2015/2016 Description 2014/2015 2015/2016
Total (Muse) 4,033 4,242 Total (Kunming) 3,643 2,904
Natural Gas 1,471 1,830 Natural Gas 1,492 1,702
Rice 419 341 Tin and Iron Ores 546 494
Sugar n.a. 331 Precious Stones 1,010 371
Jade 728 306 Wood 360 143
Maize 391 304 Misc Grain,Seed,Fruit 59 66
Beans 186 160 Rubber 86 60
Sesamum Seeds 154 105 Edible Fruit And Nuts 22 20
Marine Products 90 85 Cereals 15 16
Melon 94 84 Salt;Sulfur;Earth,Stone 10 9
Broken Rice 79 79 Rare Earth 2 6
Others 421 618 Others 41 18
Myanmar's imports from China by Muse Customs Office (US$, mil.) China's exports to Myanmar by Kunming Customs Office (US$, mil.)
Description 2014/2015 2015/2016 Description 2014/2015 2015/2016
Total (Muse) 1,835 1,709 Total (Kunming) 4,719 3,740
Transport Equipment 689 562 Electrical Machinery 950 865
Base Metals and Manufactures 225 235 Vehicles (Motor Cycles, Trucks, Parts) 832 701
Electrical Machinery and Apparatus 141 157 Precious Stones 962 343
Fertilizer 160 153 Machinery 321 324
Machinery and Mechanical Appaliance 152 136 Manmade Staple Fibers 210 190
Plastic and Articles Thereof 47 57 Mineral Fuel 239 148
Chemical Elements and Compounds 19 24 Iron/Steel Products 102 130
Cement 19 22 Edible Fruit and Nuts 85 113
Rubber Manufactures n.a. 15 Iron and Steel 105 100
Scientific Instruments n.a. 14 Aluminum 46 87
Others 346 333 Others 865 739
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Table 5. China’s mango imports versus Myanmar’s mango exports 
 
Sources: China Customs; Myanmar Fruit, Flower and Vegetable Producer and Exporter Association. 
World
(tons)
Myanmar
(tons)
2006/2007 3,210 120 n.a.
2007/2008 2,235 124 n.a.
2008/2009 20,875 18,504 n.a.
2009/2010 32,920 29,929 n.a.
2010/2011 23,985 21,843 n.a.
2011/2012 27,771 25,491 38,803
2011/2012 27,376 25,209 37,840
2012/2013 24,709 21,106 30,859
2013/2014 4,989 0 37,720
2015/2016 7,355 0 27,341
China's Imports Myanmar's
Export to
China via
Muse
(tons)
